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Abstract 
 
 
This paper attempts to provide a new framework of analysis for understanding China’s 
international relations. It argues that “traditional” conceptions of international relations, based 
on “statist” and “realist” methodology, do not capture the dynamics of China’s international 
relations in an era of globalisation. Rather, we need to consider the analytical tools of 
international political economy as a means of breaking down the analytical barriers between 
the domestic and the international, and between politics and economics. At the same time as 
enriching the study of China, such an approach can also enrich the discipline of international 
political economy, by breaking away from the OECD-centric nature of much research in the 
field. 
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Introduction 
This paper is in some ways a paper of frustration – a frustration that emerges from the pitfalls 
that emerge in many of the dominant approaches to considering China’s political economy in 
an era of globalisation. At the risk of caricaturing a vast canon of literature, much of what is 
written on China – particularly from inside China – fail to address the analytical problems of 
separating the domestic from the international, and separating economics from politics. It is, 
in effect, methodologically overly-statist and realist. 
 
This basic failing can be addressed by deploying the analytical tools of International Political 
Economy (IPE). Nevertheless, much of the wider work on IPE and globalisation also contains 
methodological problems. Too much of this work is informed by theories developed by 
examining advanced industrialised economies, or tries to find a once and for all overarching 
explanation of the relationship between states and markets, or takes the nation state as the 
basic unit of analysis (or in some cases, all three). While IPE studies of the implication of 
globalisation and the state have become more “pluralistic” in case studies1, and more nuanced 
in approach, many approaches still do not transfer efficaciously to the study of developing 
states. 
 
Building on Payne’s analysis of the political economy of area studies2, the objective of this 
paper, then, is both quite straightforward and rather grand at the same time. My basic 
argument is that the study of IPE needs to become more sensitive to case studies from the 
developing world, with a recognition of the different characters of “the state” outside the 
advanced industrialised world. This can be achieved by enriching the theory with more case 
studies built on a detailed knowledge of the specifics of individual examples to provide a 
truly comparative basis for the development of theory. At the same time, the study of China 
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can be enhanced by deploying the analytical tools of IPE to consider China’s political 
economy under conditions of globalisation.  
 
Taking an eclectic mix of the work of those in a Coxian tradition, particularly  the New 
Political Economy (NPE) approach associated with Payne and Gamble among others, and an 
understanding of class formation, we can provide a framework for analysing the increasing 
complexity of policy making – a framework which respects the inherent power of states, but 
also considers the power of non-state actors in the global political economy, and the way in 
which the global becomes embedded within domestic policy making. By marrying “area 
studies” and IPE, both can become more enhanced as analytical frameworks and provide a set 
of research questions and/or hypotheses to illuminate future studies of China’s political 
economy.  
 
International Relations Studies of China 
One of the main argument in this paper is that dominant approaches to studying Chinese 
international relations (IR) place too great an emphasis on the national state as the level of 
analysis, and is built on statist and realist notions of international relations. Before going any 
further, it is important to reiterate my comment in the introduction that I am not making a 
Kenichi Ohmaeesque3 argument that the state is irrelevant to the functioning of the 
international system – that the state is “dead”. It would be meaningless to consider China’s IR 
without recognising the importance of formal diplomatic and government to government 
relations. It is also meaningless to deny the importance of the state as the key actor in China’s 
IR, and even China’s international economic relations. I will argue later that a key dynamic in 
China’s IR is the relationship between local state actors, and international non-state actors. 
But that is not to deny that “high” politics at the national state level creates the conditions 
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within which this localised relationship takes place. Taiwanese businessmen may play an 
important role in shaping the evolution of places like Dongguan, but the national state organs 
still retain overall control of the relationship between Taiwan and the PRC. It is not one or the 
other, but how the two interact. 
 
Nevertheless, I do suggest that on their own, statist and intergovernmental levels of analysis 
do not tell the full story. In particular, I argue that the focus on bilateral relations at the 
national level misses key determinants of China’s IR, and the way in which external forces 
partially shape the evolution of China’s political economy – particularly in light of China’s 
WTO entry. First, I simply argue that the mainstream IR literature misses the salience of 
economic actors – particularly non-state economic actors. Second, I suggest that national 
levels of perception miss the uneven geographical and sectoral pattern of China’s 
international economic relations and the political implications of this process4. It is true that 
many in China and outside have long recognised the importance of local authorities in forging 
China’s international economic relations. However this is often considered as an issue in 
itself, or as an “economics” issue, or in terms of a set of “localised” relationships – for 
example, in the concept of an emerging “greater china” economic space.  
 
The task, I suggest, is to consider the politics of these “economic” issues, and the extent to 
which they are embedded in wider regional and global processes, rather than simply being 
localised phenomena. In short, the task is to consider the linkages between domestic politics, 
domestic economics, international relations, and international economics. Processes of 
regionalisation generate both localised and internationalised networks of relationships that 
need to be considered alongside the bilateral to gain a full understanding of how best to 
theorise contemporary Chinese international relations. 
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There is now a relatively developed literature on the development of IR as a discipline within 
China, and the development of a Chinese IR theory. Outside China, the most well known are 
not surprisingly those written in English by scholars (many of whom have spent considerable 
time outside China) such as Gerald Chan5, Wang Feiling and Yong Deng6, Zhang Yongjin7, 
Jia Qingguo8 and so on. There is also familiarity with the work of Chinese academics who 
increasingly participate in English language conferences and often write in English – in 
addition to those Fudan colleagues at this conference, this would include Wang Jisi, Wang 
Yizhou, Wang Liping, Peng Zhaochang, Yuan Ming, and Song Xinning among others. While 
Zhang Yongjin has noted an increasing interest in the English School as a methodological 
tool within Chinese IR9, I think that it is still fair to say that there are three main problems 
that obstruct the emergence of a Chinese IR that can deal effectively and in a nuanced 
manner, with IR under conditions of globalisation.  
 
The first is an over concentration on relations with the United States, and the “conditioning” 
element that this places on Chinese IR. It is clearly the case that the US is objectively more 
important for China than, for example, the European Union, or individual European states for 
Chinese policy makers and researchers. That being said, it is instructive that in Wang and 
Yong’s “In the Eyes of the Dragon”10 there is no chapter at all on Europe (including Russia) – 
and not only are Europe and European states absent from the contents list, but also absent 
from the index.  The single reference to any European state is three lines on the UK handover 
of Hong Kong.   
 
While this Americancentricism is understandable through a policy lens, there is another 
dimension to be considered here. Through the provision of scholarships and grants, a period 
of study in the United States is still the most probable and attractive option for Chinese IR 
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scholars wishing to study in the west – through which the dominance of US perspectives in 
international relations11 is partially transmitted to the emerging IR community in China.  
 
This brings me to a second point. Much of the IR literature in China remains concerned with 
issues of sovereignty and statehood and is built on realist and statist methods. For Song 
Xinning, this is a function of three domestic constraints: 
“The overarching constraint [on IR theory in China] is a structural one,  
being the social setting in which the study of IR in China takes place.”12  
For Song, the main domestic constraints are the dominance of policy related research, the 
residual ideology, and the importance of the state itself in Chinese discourses.  
 
In addition, Song argues that “The divides which separate discipline s and institutions are still 
very deep in China”13. This separation, has obstructed the emergence of an IPE which 
considers the importance of non-state actors and economics in general in the study of IR. 
Whilst there is an IPE discipline in China – as this conference amply shows – it is dominated 
by a type of IPE which again is heavily influenced by US academia. On one level, Zhu 
Wenli’s paper in Contemporary China on IPE in China reveals a focus on an IPE which is 
heavily statist, and largely defined in response to US IPE theories as analytical tools – 
particularly hegemonic stability theory14. As she argues: 
 “The emergence of global issues is portrayed as the expansion of the 
diplomatic arena.”15 
The issues that now face governments may be increasingly transnational in character, but the 
solution is still seen as being found in intergovernmental dialogue and processes. Under this 
approach, economic affairs often ignored as being “economics” or more often subsumed as a 
subject that can be dealt with by state-to-state relations. 
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On another level, Song and Chan argue that there is a strong concept in China that equates 
IPE with: 
 “The approaches used by Western scholars in IPE studies, such as rational 
choice, game theory, mathematical and statistical methods”16 
Again, this reflects the over-dependence on the US as a source of ideas – even if those ideas 
are being rejected - in the Chinese IR and IPE discipline(s). As we shall see in the debate over 
areas studies below, many within the US are also concerned about the dominance of rational 
choice approaches as a methodological “science” for studying international relations. And a 
conception of IPE as a framework of analysis that moves beyond the dominance of US 
approaches can help provide methodological tools that really can take us a step further in 
theory building.  
 
At the very least, it is fair to say that non-statist critical IPE has yet to make a significant 
impact on Chinese international relations studies. Little focus is placed on whose interests 
within individual countries are being served by these economic initiatives. Nor is much 
attention placed on the role of non-state actors – for example, the role of those that Strange 
terms the “international business civilisation”17 or Cox would describe as the “transnational 
managerial class”18 that “play an major role in almost all levels of the regional policy-making 
process”19. 
 
The above is not intended to “rubbish” Chinese academia – far from it. Very similar 
comments could be made about the majority of western observations of IR in general, and 
Chinese IR in particular. Wæver has shown, for example, how publications in the mainstream 
IR journals in general are dominated by rational choice and realist approaches (and also by 
authors based in the US)20. Nor is China the only country where the link between academia 
and policy making can create methodological myopia. Indeed, at times it is difficult to know 
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whether some scholars are writing about US policy towards China, or trying to write that 
policy itself. It is also the case that much of the US literature on China’s IR also ignores, for 
example, Europe. In a rather neat comparison with Wang and Deng, neither does Johnston 
and Ross’s edited collection on “Engaging China” have a single chapter on Europe21. Finally, 
divisions between disciplines are also strong outside China22. There is, for example, a 
considerable literature that discusses China’s international economic relations – but the 
division between economics, IR, and political and economic geography remain largely 
entrenched.  
 
I suggest, then, that IR specialists in China and without need to look further than just the US 
for the theoretical models used to analyse Chinese IR. And if this is the case for IR theorists, 
it also holds true in different ways for those who would consider themselves to be in the “area 
studies” camp as well. 
 
Area Studies versus Economics and Rational Choice Theories 
The debate over the relationship between area studies and discipline has been raging in the 
US for over half a decade now. A key impulse for this debate was the decision to fill the chair 
in Japanese politics a Stanford vacated by the retiring Chalmers Johnson with a specialist in 
rational choice theory, largely considered by insiders in the Asian studies community to have 
little to no background in Japanese studies. Broadly speaking, the complaints from the area 
studies disciplines revolve around the notion that economics, and its bastard offspring, 
rational choice theory, have become hegemonic in academic discourses. According to 
Johnson23, rational choice theorists are attempting to promote their agenda by discriminating 
against “unscientific” area studies.  
 
The dominance of rational choice theory in much of US political science does create 
significant problems for the study of politics and international relations. So too do 
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interpretations of policy based on pure economic theory. Take, as just one example, this 
section from a World Bank report on the potential impact of the WTO on Chinese agriculture: 
 “Over the longer term, increased liberalization in China will accelerate the 
shift of agriculture away from areas of comparative disadvantage towards its 
comparative advantage. There is likely to be a more pronounced decline in the 
production of land-intensive sectors, such as livestock, fruit, flowers and 
vegetables. Liberalization of global agricultural barriers should augment this 
trend as it provides China with increased access to other countries’ markets in 
return for its one-sided concessions”24 
The economic theory might be sound. But let’s assume for a moment that people all do act as 
rational actors based on full knowledge. Even then, it is difficult to imagine the peasant trying 
to scratch a living out of the barren earth in Shaanxi having the knowledge, the wherewithal 
and investment, and indeed even the right type of land and climate to make such a change. 
Geography, topology, and nature can be frustrating obstacles to the transference of economic 
theory into practice.  
 
It is not my intention here to embark on a detailed account of the relationship between politics 
and economics in IPE – that was a task undertaken in Richard Higgott’s paper at this 
conference25. Suffice to say that within the IFIs, economistic approaches have come to 
dominate much research, and also to have a disproportionate influence on policy making 
methodology. But while it is right to be sceptical of the efficacy of rational choice and 
economic theory as explanatory tools and methods, it is important not to fall back into a 
defence of area studies that denies the relevance and utility of all theoretical approaches. Area 
studies as an academic programme in the United States in the post War era owed much to the 
conditions of the Cold War. In perhaps the classic interpretation of the evolution of Area 
Studies in Cold War USA, Bruce Cumings notes: 
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“For a generation after World War II the bipolar conflict between Moscow 
and Washington and the hegemonic position of the United States in the world 
economy drew academic boundaries that had the virtue of clarity: ‘area 
studies’ and ‘international studies’, backed with enormous public and private 
resources, had clear reference to places or to issues and processes that became 
important to study. The places were usually countries, but not just any 
countries: Japan got favored placement as a success story of development, 
and China got obsessive attention as a pathological example of abortive 
development. The key processes were things like modernization, or what was 
for many years called ‘political development’ toward the explicit or implicit 
goal of liberal democracy.”26 
 
At the very least, the need to understand what was going on in the “closed” environments of 
communist party states inspired many of the university degrees and scholarships to study 
language and culture. Building on McGeorge Bundy27, Cumings notes the close relationship 
between many US academics and the US Office of Strategic Studies, and how the US area 
studies community found much of its funding28. In Europe, too, Cold War politics played a 
part in shaping academic interest, courses and programmes. For example, the special foreign 
office funding for the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London, 
whilst initially inspired by the needs of serving the British Empire, was at least invigorated by 
the needs of the foreign policy community to train specialists to understand places like China.  
 
In some respects, then, the area studies discipline, particularly but not only related to the 
study of China, needs to come to terms with the changing geo-strategic environment within 
which it functions. The Cold War context that Cumings argued drew the lines of demarcation 
between area studies and international relations has gone. To use a Maoist concept 
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(incorrectly), the primary contradiction is no longer a geo-strategic one based on security, but 
a geo-economic one based on increased economic interdependence (albeit an asymmetric 
interdependence) through greater trade and investment flows. And this means that the 
boundaries between the domestic and the international become ever more blurred, requiring 
an analysis of how the two interact: 
 “The separation between the global and the local no longer holds, as the new 
hierarchies of the global economy cut across regional and national 
boundaries”29 
This in turn requires an understanding of the dynamics of the external environment, actors 
and processes. 
 
In the case of “Chinese studies”, the end of the geo-strategic context of study has coincided 
with the end of a period of relative autarky. Until perhaps as late as Deng Xiaoping’s nan xun 
in 1992, Chinese politics could be studied almost entirely in terms of domestic dynamics. 
And while I would contend that such “domesticism” was no longer efficacious for much of 
the 1990s, China’s post-WTO political economy clearly cannot be considered without a 
recognition of the role of external factors. 
 
The debate over the validity and future of area studies versus discipline should not just be 
conducted within the narrow confines of US academia, and in the specific context of a revolt 
against hegemonic approaches in the shape of economics and rational choice theory. As 
Kasaba argues30, area studies requires a “revitalizing” impact by combining the study of 
individual cultures and areas with wider disciplinary understanding – not rational choice 
“science”, but other disciplines that help us best understand the local-global context of the 
contemporary world. Kesaba’s main interest is in postmodernist approaches – and while this 
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is not my own interest here, I share his basic tenet that the aim is not to replace old 
disciplinary barriers between “area studies” and “international relations” with new barriers: 
 “In order not to use this as yet another way of creating divisions, we should 
start from the premise that the modern era is generative its own 
comprehensive world view that encompasses all places and groups who are in 
interaction with each other”31 
 
So if we move away from an internecine battle within US academia, we can find ways in 
which area and discipline come together to enhance each other. This is done by recognising 
that there are a set of internationalised factors that face most, if not all states – factors that can 
fall under the broad heading of “globalisation”. But also by recognising that these globalising 
factors will play out in different ways in different states because of the embedded domestic 
contexts of each individual state32. We need the discipline to understand the former, and the 
area studies to understand the latter.  
 
Studying IPE in an era of globalization 
I have suggested that dominant approaches to understanding contemporary Chinese IR have a 
number of pitfalls for researchers. However, I am not suggesting that IPE has all the answers. 
On the contrary, a starting point for this paper is that IPE itself can become enhanced by 
taking on a more comparative nature that is aware of the contexts of individual states – and in 
particular, states from non-core areas of the global political economy.  
 
From Kenichi Ohmae33 at one extreme to Hirst and Thomspon34 at the other, there is a vast 
literature attempting to understand what globalisation really means (or in the case of Hirst and 
Thompson, to ask if it is even happening at all). As of March 2002, a grand total of 1,500 
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books listed on the Amazon web page with globalisation or globalization in the title. As 
Taylor puts it: 
 “To say that “globalisation” is the new mantra of our contemporary era is to 
be at once both banal and profound. Few other words has been so used and 
abused in recent times, or have generated so much printed word and 
comment. Yet, for all the rhetoric surrounding globalisation, its meaning 
remains both vague and elusive and symbolises a host of different things to 
different people.”35 
In a similar vein, Hurrell notes that: 
 “Although rarely tied to any very clearly articulated theory, it has become a 
very powerful metaphor for the sense that a number of universal processes are 
at work generating increased interconnection and interdependence between 
states and between societies.”36 [original emphasis] 
 
There is simply not space here to trawl through all the different IPE interpretations of 
globalisation37, and clearly any comment about the nature of globalisation, and IPE studies of 
it, runs the risk of making massive generalisations. However, just as there are methodological 
pitfalls in using dominant approaches to understand China’s IR in an era of globalisation, so 
too there are potential methodological pitfalls in the IPE literature. At the risk of 
oversimplification, these can be described as universalism, the OECD-centric nature of much 
IPE research, the emphasis on the nation state as the unit of analysis, and teleological pitfalls. 
 
Universalism 
The first pitfall is one that emerges from trying to make definitive statements that contain 
universal truths. Trying to find a once and for all answer to, for example, which has power, 
states or markets, is essentially misguided. The real quest should be twofold. The first is to 
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discover differential levels of power in the international political economy – an approach 
which fits well with conceptions in the Chinese literature regarding the uneven nature of 
power in a unipolar globalised world. Quite simply, there are clear divergence in different 
state's ability to dictate, respond or react to globalising forces. This study, then, shares an 
understanding with those scholars who perceive globalisation as an uneven process38. For 
proponents of this view, rather than globalisation leading to harmonisation and convergence: 
 “Existing inequalities make it more likely that globalization will lead to an 
increasingly sharp division between 'core' states, who share in the values and 
benefits of a global world economy and polity, and 'marginalised' states”39 
 
The second is to embrace divergence and, deploying the insights of area studies, consider how 
the relationship between states and power, between structure and agency, is determined within 
individual settings. IPE should not only allow diversity, but indeed emphasize the fact that 
there is no single answer; no single set of relationships; no single simple understanding. The 
researcher should consider, particularly through comparative approaches, how different sets 
of relationships emerge with different balances of power between actors in different and 
specific historical, geographical, social and political contexts. As Tim Shaw has argued: 
 “any local to global social relationship inevitably includes a trio of 
heterogeneous actors … To be sure the balance among this trio varies 
between regions and issue-areas & over time but none of them can be 
excluded or overlooked in any ongoing relationship”40 
This is an approach that does not lead to simplicity. Nor does it lend itself to snappy book 
titles or defining characteristics that ensure good results on citation indexes. But as Hettne 
and Söderbaum41 argue, the world is complex, and saying this is much better than truncating 
reality to the fit methodological or ideological predilection. 
 15
IPE as a study of developed states 
The search for universal truths is helped when the universe is contracted. Tony Payne has 
argued that the theories of hegemony were largely constructed around observations of the US 
experience, moderated by some comparisons with Europe. What we end up with is a concept 
constructed from a narrow set of cases. More to the point, a concept that because it is so case 
(or a few cases) specific might not have relevance outside that setting. The same argument 
can be made for many of the approaches within IPE42. Once we move outside the setting of 
the case studies (either explicit or more inferential) that have been used to construct theory, 
then the applicability of theory becomes more questionable.  
 
One of the major research questions for IPE scholars is to consider the relationship between 
the state and the market. Indeed, there are around 100 published books in English alone where 
the main focus is to discuss the relationship in one way or another43. But much of this 
literature is based on understandings that are predicated on an understanding of the role of the 
state in the contemporary world that is based on the experience of advanced industrialised 
democracies. Such a separation of state and market that underpins much IPE analysis in the 
West does not always hold true outside the context of the west itself. 
 
Van Woferen, for example, has long argued that analysts from the “west” fail to understand 
Japan because they start with false assumptions. The concept of a separation between 
“public” and “private” that lies at the heart of some investigations of political economy is, 
according to van Wolferen, absent in Japan. For Deans, this is a consequence both of “both 
the traditional understanding of ‘economy’ in East Asia and the way in which market 
economies were established there” 44. Indeed, in some respects, following Polanyi45 it is not 
so much Japanese capitalism that is “different” as European capitalism, and of course, the 
USA. It was the “great transformation” of industrialisation in Europe in the nineteenth 
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century that marks the “singular departure” from the dominant norm by creating the 
institutional separation of society into an economic and political sphere.  
 
In essence, the argument here is that the nature of the Japanese state and Japanese capitalism 
is different. It might have an industrial structure that looks a bit like a western one, but the 
nature of the state and the nature of Japanese capitalism is not the same as the nature of the 
US state and US capitalism, or European states and European capitalisms. Capitalism in 
Japan developed in a different way from in the west due to “pre-industrial legacies, patterns 
of industrialization, and twentieth-century state structures and policies”46. Indeed, even within 
the west, there is no single model of capitalism, and no single model of “the state”. A study of 
comparative capitalisms, then, is an essential component of recognising divergence.  
 
There are effectively two problems here. The first is the aforementioned dominance of studies 
of advanced industrialised economies. Even in some of the best works on comparative 
capitalisms, the emphasis remains on advanced industrialised economies. Coates47, for 
example, concentrates on a comparison between the US, Sweden, Germany and the UK, 
while Crouch and Streeck48 similarly consider Italy, Sweden, the UK, France, the US and 
Japan. A similar tripartite analysis of Europe-the US-Japan is also evident in Berger and 
Dore49. While these works serve a very useful purpose in exposing the varieties of capitalism 
within advanced industrialised societies, the lack of analyses of less developed economies is 
marked.  
 
Similarly, with a brief exception for analyses of the Asian financial crises, discussions of 
developing states are in a minority in the major IPE journals. Here, though, we should note a 
difference between US journals and those in Europe – particularly the UK, and particularly in 
New Political Economy50. It is notable that among the editors of New Political Economy there 
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is a strong “developing area” expertise. It is also the case that in inception, New Political 
Economy emphasises not a single theoretical approach, but a framework or “toolkit”51 which 
embraces non-exclusionary pluralistic approaches: 
 “The methodology of the new political economy rejects the old dichotomy 
between agency and structure, and states and markets, which fragmented 
classical political economy into separate disciplines. It seeks instead to build 
on those approaches in social sciences which have tried to develop an 
integrated analysis.52 
 
There may be good reasons for this relative under-representation, particularly in the US. One 
explanation could simply be that there are not enough people writing on developing areas 
using IPE perspectives. Another explanation is found in the good work on IPE that appears in 
development oriented journals and in “area studies” journals. Indeed, the logic of career 
enhancement often leads towards publishing in a relatively narrow set of journals conceived 
as the appropriate outlet by the peer community.  
 
The second problem emerges from the potential of concept stretching. If Van Wolferen is 
right, and western paradigms are used to try and understand things that look similar in Japan, 
then problem becomes magnified when we move on to look at states like China. When China 
was “different” – when it was a state planned economy – then it was relatively easy to 
analyse. We knew that it was different and treated it as such (though sometimes falsely 
putting it in a box with other “different” states – assuming that socialist economies were all 
the same for example). As China has reformed and moved away from socialism, we have 
perhaps found it increasingly difficult to box. Dealing with the bits that are still different 
remains relatively easy. The problem is the problem of the familiar. 
 
 18
As just one example here, there is a widespread understanding of how stock markets work 
and why they exist in the west. And as china now has stock markets, it is tempting to assume 
that they serve the same functions in China and work in the same way as they do in London, 
Frankfurt or New York. But as China “area study” specialists know, not only do Chinese 
stock markets serve different purposes and interests, but the stock exchanges in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen each have different characteristics. The embedded power of the state in the 
emerging Chinese market economy means that we have to be very careful in deploying 
modes of analysis devised from case studies in very different parts of the world. 
 
The nation state as the unit of analysis 
As with much of the economics and IR literature, there is still a tendency in IPE to consider 
the nation state as the unit of analysis. Even studies of globalisation normally consider how 
this impacts on states, rather than disaggregating the state as a unit of analysis. On a very 
simple level, we need to remember perhaps the first question of politics – who gets what ? So 
we should not ask if, for example, will China benefit from joining the WTO? But instead ask 
who will benefit and who will not. As China specialists know, reform has had a highly 
differential impact on Chinese society. The gap between the urban and the rural is just one 
example, to which we could add the benefits accruing to the existing elites versus the benefits 
accruing to the workers53, and many others.  
 
And of course, the Chinese case also reveals massive regional differentials – while some parts 
of China have become embedded within internationalised networks of production and are 
highly integrated into the global economy, other parts of the country are at best, only 
marginally participating. This is not to say that they are unaffected by globalisation, but to 
suggest that they are not internationally “integrated”. This is often explained by making a 
bipolar division between coastal and interior China. This approach is helpful in establishing 
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the differential nature of the internationalisation of China – but only partially so. There are, 
for example, many TVEs in the interior which have benefited greatly from 
internationalisation, and have significantly contributed to the growth of Chinese exports. As 
such, while geographically based concepts of divergence are clearly important, they do not 
tell the whole story of the differential impact of globalisation on China. 
 
This recognition of the differential impact within nation states is manifest in only a few 
theoretical pieces considering the political economy of regional integration relatively small 
body of IR literature dealing with globalisation and integration54.  There are a number of good 
case studies discussing the significance of sub-national and cross-national regional integration 
in various parts of the world. Nevertheless, work on microregionalism, and the way that 
globalisation can lead to a disjuncture between the national political and emerging 
transnational economic spaced remains an understudied phenomenon55. 
 
Teleology and Politics: What Drives Globalisation? 
The final potential pitfall is the danger of falling into teleological explanations. To be fair, 
teleological explanations do not have much salience in IPE discourses in the west any more. 
However, in discussing globalisation in China, I have often come across the view that 
globalisation is an economic phenomena, and not a political one. This view is based on a 
separation of economics and politics that is also evident in wider interpretations of 
globalisation. In its extreme form this can lead to understandings that take globalisation as a 
given factor, or something that is divorced from politics.  
 
In proposing an IPE framework for considering China’s IR in an era of globalisation, it is 
essential to start from an understanding that globalisation does not just happen. It is a 
phenomenon which is driven by a combination of technological advances, and changing 
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patterns of production, which places a significant element of “power” in the decisions of non-
state economic actors. It is also driven by the policy preferences and dominant ideas within 
the major international financial institutions. But it is also the result of the actions and 
policies of governments, based on an acceptance that neoliberal economic policies are the 
best way of generating growth. In this respect, globalization also entails an ideological 
dimension. In combination, as Bernard and Ravenhill argue in relation to the political 
economy of East Asia: 
 “We have argued that the emerging political economy of East Asia should be 
understood in terms of the relationship between changes in the global 
political economy, changes in the political economy of individual states, and 
changes in the organization of production.”56 
 
One of the key driving forces for globalization, then, has been technological changes which 
have facilitated changing modes of production. For Oman, a: 
 “principle macroeconomic force shaping those dynamics and driving 
‘globalization’ …. is the ongoing development, formidable competitive 
strength, and spread …. of post-Taylorist “flexible” approaches to the 
organization of production within and between firms’.57 
While there has always been world trade, the structure of that trade has changed. Rather than 
raw materials flowing to production sites, and finished goods flowing to markets, the 
production of a single commodity can now take place at a number of  different stages in a 
number of different states.  
“capitalism today…entails the detailed disaggregation of stages of production 
and consumption across national boundaries, under the organizational 
structure of densely networked firms or enterprises’ .58 
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As such the investment-trade nexus has become increasingly significant, as investments move 
to the most profitable location for specific parts of the production cycle.  
  
So building on the work of Cox59, “new political economy” approach associated with Andrew 
Gamble, Tony Payne and others60 argues that the international economy of the Bretton 
Woods era characterised by exchange relations between national economies has been 
replaced by a global economy grounded in production and finance: 
“the formative aspect of the new global political economy is seen to be the 
structural power of internationally mobile capital. States now have to 
recognise the power not only of other states and international organisations 
…. but also of international capital, the banks, and foreign exchange 
markets.”61 
It is a system where non-sate actors play a significant role in shaping financial and 
commodity flows, but one in which states and state actors do much to facilitate the 
globalisation.  
 
In some respects, we have to take one step back and consider the political dimensions that lie 
behind the growing power of non-state actors in the global political economy. As the German 
Budestag report on globalization forcefully argued: 
 “The growing worldwide integration of economies came not by any law of 
nature – it has been the result of active and deliberate policies’.62 
First, we need to consider how non-state actors came to have such power in the first place. 
For example, while Susan Strange asserts that transnational corporations (TNCs) are key 
actors in the promotion of globalised production: 
 “this has not happened entirely by accident. The shift from state authority to 
market authority has been in large part the result of state policies. It was not 
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that the TNCs stole or purloined power from the government of states. It was 
handed to them on a plate - and, moreover, for 'reasons of state'."63 
Strange goes on to argue that even the US government could not contain the forces that it 
unleashed, and that even the world’s most powerful government finds its actions constrained 
by the actions of TNCs. But nevertheless, this should not obscure the fact that the original 
liberalization of the economic structure was based on political choice and decisions. 
 
It might help here to distinguish between globalism as a statist project, and globaisation as a 
process. Globalism is a project which has been pursued with vigor by the successive US 
administrations, supported by the neo-liberal agendas of other governments in the advanced 
capitalist world. It sought to spread specific political, economic, security and social forms of 
interaction and understanding on a global spatial scale. It is symbolized in particular by 
Reagonite-Thatcherite efforts to spread the market economy, and promote neo-liberal 
economic strategies through both its own actions, and via the policies of the major 
international financial institutions. Globalization, in contrast, is a process of growing 
interconnectedness in these different dimensions driven where non-state actors utilise the 
economic and legal structures that have been established by political elites - for example, by 
business enterprises which develop a global strategy in order to maintain international 
competitiveness and ensure continued profitability. In short, globalism as a political project 
creates the environment in which globalization can proceed. 
 
This analysis effectively concentrates on what we might call the initiators of globalization. 
But we also need to consider the political dynamic of globalization in developing states. In 
the 1960s and 1970s, much of the literature on developing states concentrated on the attempts 
to ensure that developing states did not become locked in a system of dependency on the core 
states. There is also a considerable literature on the way in which international financial 
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institutions forced neoliberal agendas on developing countries through conditionalities on aid 
packages. But in the current era, the dynamic is very different. As Bowles argues: 
“By 1991 the purpose ….. was no longer premised on the need to be more 
independent of the global economy but rather seen as a measure to ensure 
continued participation in it. The fear of developing countries was no longer 
one of dependence on the global economy but rather was seen as a measure to 
ensure continued participation in it.”64 
If globalization is the new dependency theory, then it is in large parts a domestically self-
imposed dependency –dependency as the best way of achieving growth. 
 
There are two key issues to consider here. The first is the “ideological” or “ideational” 
change. In short, key elites in much of the developing world have altered their policy 
preferences and accepted the neo-liberal project as the best method of achieving growth. The 
second issue relates to specific policy changes designed to facilitate globalization. While the 
internet and telecommunications facilities increase the speed of communication, goods still 
have to be transported around the world on ships, trucks and trains. And in order to do this, 
you need the necessary “hard” infrastructure, more often provided through state investment 
rather than through private sector funding: 
“Transport and communications are “massively state-subsidised, and the 
overhead costs of transport and communication (e.g. policing, rules and 
regulations) are met not by the users but by the general public”65 
 
Furthermore, policies conducive to the international economy do not just occur on their own. 
The Special Economic Zones are not “natural economic territories”, as Scalapino66 has 
defined emerging cross border micro-regions – they were established through political fiat, 
and supported by other state policies on taxation, distribution and so on. And perhaps most 
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importantly of all for the future, the decision to join the WTO, and to accept all the 
disciplining elements of neo-liberalism that will follow, was a political choice. 
 
In summary, this internal process of change has been promoted by what Leslie Sklair terms 
“globalising state bureaucrats” 67, who might also be considered as constituting a party-state 
comprador class. This group, epitomised by the policies of Zhu Rongji, is engaged in a 
process of making the investment regime within China more and more liberalised and 
“attractive” to international capital, and reforming the domestic economic structure to reduce 
domestic protectionism, and institute a more neoliberal economic paradigm. In combination, 
these processes can best be understood by using a framework of analysis established by 
Robert Cox: 
“There is something that could be called a nascent historic bloc consisting of 
the most powerful corporate economic forces, their allies in government, and 
the variety of networks that evolve policy guidelines and propagate the 
ideology of globalisation. States now by and large play the role of agencies of 
the global political economy, with the task of adjusting national economic 
policies and practices to the perceived exigencies of global economic 
liberalism. This structure of power is sustained from outside the state through 
a global policy consensus and the influence of global finance over state 
policy, and from inside the state from those social forces that benefit from 
globalisation (the segment of society that is integrated into the world 
economy)…Neo-liberalism is hegemonic ideologically and in terms of 
policy.”68 
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Towards a Framework of Analysis 
Studying Chinese IR 
In terms of the study of China’s international relations, this framework suggests moving away 
from bilateral and statist interpretations of IR. In particular, its suggests an increased attention 
on the interaction between Chinese state elites at various levels, and external non-state actors. 
There is a lot of good research being undertaken on the way in which parts of China are 
integrating with the global economy, with a particular and entirely proper emphasis on 
China’s coastal provinces. This work which emphasises the partial national nature of 
integration into the global economy, and points to issues related to the integration of the 
national economy as a whole makes an important contribution to theoretical understandings 
regarding the impact of globalisation on nation states. However, there are two areas in which 
this work needs strengthening. 
 
The first is in the way that these analyses fit into overall analyses of China’s IR. While some 
may reject this on the grounds that the relationships under investigation are purely economic, 
this denies the linkages between politics and economics outlined above. The role and 
importance of local governments is also important on the Japanese side. Glenn Hook, for 
example, has written extensively on the role of local governments in Japan in forging 
economic links with Japan’s neighbours69. Indeed, the local-local nexus is already an 
important component in Sino-Japanese economic relations. Witness, for example, the links 
between the sister cities of Kita Kyushu and Dalian. These links are not just built on local 
government dialogue. The local state is the key facilitator, but contacts are also dependent on 
local bureaux of MITI, local governments, Japanese representative offices in China, 
individual companies, the relationship between different companies in the supply chain70, 
providers of transportation, and even the role of Chinese students who have returned to China 
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after being educated in Japan71. In this case, the role of the local state acting to further the 
interests of non-state economic actors (primarily on the Japanese side) is particularly notable.  
 
Second, it is important not to focus to closely on specific localised manifestations such 
relationships. There is, for example, now a considerable literature on the emergence of this 
thing called “Greater China”. Some of this literature (good examples include Naughton72 and 
Hamilton73) has, at its heart, an understanding of the complexities of the relationship. Going 
beyond a simple bilateral level of analysis, they consider the wider regional and global 
processes involved. But many others do not. They are instead over-concerned with, for 
example, showing how China is trying to ensnare Taiwan through economic relations. Even 
some of those analyses that recognise that the political borders of China are not the 
parameters of economic activity, they then often replace a politically defined boundary of 
economic activity with another one – even if this new one is the conflation of a number of 
different political boundaries. An understanding of a “Greater China” economic space is 
constructed which does as much to underplay the significance of Japan and the United States 
in the construction of capitalist processes within which localised forms of relationships exist. 
A concept designed to illuminate the transnational nature of economic relations can, without 
care, obscure more than it reveals. 
 
We need to move beyond this national basis of analysis, even when the national basis of 
analysis itself moves beyond bilateralism. We should think of how the particular and the 
localised fit with wider regional/international modes of analysis. It is entirely correct to focus 
on the way in which localised relationships between local Chinese officials and Hong Kong 
and/or Taiwanese businessmen is helping shape China’s re-engagement with the global 
economy. But these local sets of relationships do not exist in isolation. Regional and global 
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modes of production are primarily transmitted or linked into China through more localised 
relationships. Indeed, overseas Chinese networks often deliberately exploit cultural links in 
locating themselves in China. But these localised relationships are themselves predicated on 
the wider structure of a regional and global economy. The overall structure may be a regional 
one, or indeed even a global one. But the mechanism through which China is integrated can 
be a local one, or indeed, through a number of different local processes. Thus, I follow 
Smart’s understanding that: 
 “many capitalist practices are embedded in local structures, and that certain 
contexts can generate new and vibrant variations upon the theme of 
capitalism. If nothing else, globalization produces a considerably diverse set 
of local outcomes.”74 
 
The structure of regional capitalism, then, goes much deeper than bilateral levels of analysis 
can hope to explain. Nor can these implications be found in the type of statist and 
intergovernmentalist approaches to understanding East Asian regionalism that dominates in 
Chinese IR (and indeed in non-Chinese IR). Rather, we need to deploy modes of analysis that 
think in terms of production networks and/or class alliances that cut across politically drawn 
boundaries75.  
 
In particular, for those of us from a politics tradition, we should not forget basic and 
fundamental questions. Who gets what? Whose interests are served? If these questions are 
asked, then we can start to see more clearly how, alongside bilateral processes, Sino-Japanese 
relations or Sino-Taiwanese relationships are embedded in a wider network of relationships – 
even if these relationships are manifest in localised networks of overseas Chinese 
businessmen and mainland party-state-entrepreneurs. This understanding, then, does not posit 
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the local against the regional or the regional against the global as loci of analysis. Rather, it 
suggests that assessing the relationship between the local the regional (and multiple forms of 
region) and the global remains a fruitful avenue for research in the future. 
 
Studying Chinese Politics 
One of the basic tenets of the NPE approach is that the distinction between the domestic and 
the international needs to be broken down. As such, deploying IPE approaches not only has 
efficacy for studying IR, but also for the study of domestic Chinese politics. Even before 
China’s entry into the WTO, this assertion held true. But in the coming years as, for example, 
China’s legal structure continues the ongoing process of becoming WTO compliant, the 
significance of the global for the domestic in China will become increasingly apparent. It will 
remain entirely correct to consider the actions of Chinese elites from an understanding of the 
specific social, economic, historical and cultural context of China. But any such analyses will 
also have to consider the context of globalization, and the way that the market or 
neoliberalism has a disciplining impact on domestic polities. 
 
Following from this, we need to internationalise the study of factional formation and political 
alliances in China. I content that the decision to join the WTO in 1999 cannot be considered 
without a recognition of an alliance between reformers in Beijing, and those in the US and 
elsewhere that wanted to promote a type of reform in China that conforms with international 
norms and the interests of the “international community”. This idea is perhaps best summed 
up by an official White House statement of March 2000 
“China's accession agreement will deepen and help to lock in market reforms 
-- and empower those in China's leadership who want their country to move 
further and faster toward economic freedom. In opening China's 
telecommunications market, including to Internet and satellite services, the 
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agreement will expose the Chinese people to information, ideas, and debate 
from around the world. And China's accession to the WTO will help 
strengthen the rule of law in China and increase the likelihood that it will play 
by global rules”76 
Nor is it just an American approach, as the EUs trade commissioner, Pascal Lamy’s speech in 
Beijing in October 2000 illustrates: 
 “It can only lock in and deepen market reforms, empowering those in the 
leadership who support further and faster moves towards economic 
freedom”.77 
 
The boundaries between economics and politics as academic disciplines also need to be 
broken down. I suggest that the chief constraint on economic restructuring – particularly 
within the financial system – is political will, and the biggest challenge to political stability 
lies in how the leadership handles economic restructuring78. Add this to the national-
international linkages noted above, and we arrive at a situation which is almost the basic 
defining characteristic of IPE as a field of enquiry. Returning again to the WTO issue, the 
delays in reaching a final agreement after the November 1999 agreement between China and 
the USTRO can largely be explained by considering how domestic political demands in each 
negotiating partner were played out in an international forum.  
 
It is perhaps worth reiterating that I am not denying that the state is still important. What I am 
suggesting is that an understanding of the dynamics of power within China needs to be 
modified. This modification should accept that sovereignty, in the economic sphere at least, is 
“perforated”79 and that external actors now do have an influence over the functioning of the 
Chinese political economy. As suggested in the introduction, globalization has increased the 
number of actors in policy making, and, I suggest, increased the power of external actors.  
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It should also recognise that, in Sassen’s words, the global becomes embedded within the 
national. She argues that the effects of economic globalization often “materialize in national 
territories”80 and that: 
“the strategic spaces where global processes are embedded are often national; 
the mechanisms through which new legal forms, necessary for globalization, 
are implemented are often part of national state institutions”81  
Following Sassen, then, we need to investigate the impact of globalization on the institutional 
balance of power within China’s governmental structures – as suggested in the introduction, 
to argue that globalization leads to a renogotiation of relationships between state actors. 
Sassen’s main emphasis was on the shifting balance of power between different ministries 
and agencies within government – the financial agencies may gain power and influence while 
others may lose. In the specific case of the WTO, we can suggest that the state organs in 
charge of reforming the legal structure in WTO conforming manners within the National 
People’s Congress will play an increasingly important role in shaping the bases of China’s 
domestic political economy. While separating the state from the party is still an inherently 
difficult task in China, WTO membership should further strengthen the role of state organs, 
particularly legal institutions of the NPC, vis-à-vis those of the party. In this respect, 
fundamental political reform in China is inspired, or perhaps more correctly, facilitated, by an 
international economic agreement. 
 
What this suggests, then, is that the search for political change in China should not be 
constrained by views that equate political change with democratisation, or those that conceive 
that economic reform inevitably leads to democratisation82. Ironically, while such approaches 
were designed to explain the link between economic and political change, equating political 
change with political liberalisation can actually contribute to the depoliticisation of analyses 
of economic change – no liberalisation is equated with no political reform. Abandoning state 
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planning and ownership in favour of market forces and private modes of ownership are 
clearly not apolitical. But searching for democratisation and liberalisation (at this stage of 
China’s transition from socialism at least) does not allow us to understand the nature of this 
political change. Rather, we should be assessing the reformulation of political alliances and 
strategies – alliances within China’s political elites, between political elites and new 
economic elites, between elites and societal groups, and between domestic and transnational 
actors.  
 
Class is important. I noted above the efficacy of using notions of trans-national class alliances 
to understand the political implications of economic change. But there is also a domestic 
dynamic to this change. A recent report from the department of sociology at CASS has 
outlined how the Chinese social structure can now be divided into ten broad groups, each of 
which can be subdivided into smaller sub groups83. Notably, the report uses the definition of 
jieceng or social level, rather than class (jieji), but the basic understanding that economic 
reform has led to a reformulation of the bases of Chinese society would not be out of place in 
a class based analysis.  
 
This changes has been occurring long before China’s WTO entry. There has, for example, 
been a relatively large body of work considering the rise of new business elites in China84. 
There is also a smaller body of work that considers the exploitation of Chinese workers (often 
by party-state managerial classes in collaboration with external capitalists)85 and the creation 
of an “underclass” through what Solinger terms the “informalisation” of the Chinese urban 
economy86. 
 
But one of the implications of WTO entry could be to accelerate those changes. For example, 
even under rosy assumptions like those produced by the Beijing Bureau of the World Bank, 
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those industries and sectors that stand to lose most, even under rosy assumptions, are those 
where the hand of the state – or the hand of the old style of state control – still dominates87. 
Those that stand to gain most – in particularly clothing and textiles – are sectors where the 
new quasi-private sector and foreign ownership dominate. For example, attempts to calculate 
the impact of WTO entry on China’s share of world markets suggest that Chinese exports of 
clothing will rise from 19.5 per cent of world exports in 1995 to 42.2 per cent in 200588. The 
new opportunities in the service industry will likewise favour those who are not under old-
style state control. To call it a quasi-privatisation of the Chinese economy is perhaps pushing 
it too far – not least because current party-state officials (the party-state bourgeoisie) are key 
actors in the new non-state economy. But WTO membership will further facilitate the 
ownership basis of the Chinese economy and the class basis of CCP rule that has been 
ongoing since 1994. 
 
So while IPE as a discipline is largely concerned with the relationship between state and non-
state actors, in the Chinese case, the emphasis should be on how these relationships are 
emerging. In particular, although the way in which a new bourgeois class (or classes) emerge 
from within the existing party state elites – and the way that they utilise their political 
position to enhance their economic position – has been the subject of some good studies89, it 
is an issue that warrants further attention.  
 
Finally, we need to consider ideology and ideational change. If “neo-liberalism is hegemonic 
ideologically and in terms of policy”90 as Cox suggests, then we need to consider the 
mechanisms by which it becomes hegemonic. This is partly a result of the use of blunt 
instruments of power by the core states to enforce change on developing countries. For 
example, in developing his concept of “disciplinary neoliberalism”, Stephen Gill argued that: 
 “the US government is using access to its vast market as a lever of power, 
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linked to a reshaping of the international business climate, by subjecting other 
nations to the disciplines of the new constitutionalism, whilst largely refusing 
to submit to them itself.”91 
Although published almost seven years before China joined the WTO, this understanding 
could have all but been designed to understand the process. 
 
But there are also many much less blunt ways in which ideas are transferred from one setting 
to another. Through educational exchanges, the provision of training programmes to allow 
Chinese officials to become “WTO compliant”, the rise of the internet, and increased access 
to the outside world, and so on, Chinese academics, government researchers and policy 
makers. Business people too are developing new concepts and practices through processes of 
“social learning” and “industrial learning”. Chinese government policy is increasingly being 
shaped by the actions of pro-market “policy entrepreneurs”, and also by epistemic 
communities that are often transnational in nature92. And just as the Japanese authorities 
deliberately cultivated people who thought would become the next generation of Chinese 
leaders in the declining years of the Qing dynasty, so we should consider the various “aid” 
and “training” packages offered to Chinese officials in the light of WTO entry to have a clear, 
if not always explicit, political context.  
 
Conclusions 
In a special edition of New Political Economy in November 2000, Higgott and I called for: 
 “the need for regional-based groups/communities of scholars to talk more 
within a disciplinary framework in order to provide a basis for dialogue and 
comparison”93 
This desire to imbue area studies with more discipline, whilst accepting that more analyses of 
non-core states can enhance the discipline itself, was also at the core of Payne’s important 
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paper on the political economy of area studies and IPE94. The aim of this paper, then, is to 
make a contribution to an understanding of how the area specialists and the disciplinary 
specialists can come together to improve the study of each.  
 
It starts from an understanding that the way that China “receives” or “responds” to 
globalization is very much embedded in the specific historical, political and cultural contexts 
that have influenced the emergence of the contemporary Chinese political economy. But it is 
no longer possible to simply consider this Chinese political economy by only considering the 
internal dynamics of change. Through conscious political decision, elements of the Chinese 
leadership have chosen to integrate China – or at least, parts of China – into the global 
political economy. In the process, they have allowed Chinese sovereignty, in the economic 
sphere at least, to become “perforated”, and increased the number of actors in the policy 
sphere. As Stange so forcefully put it in response to Krasner in the Review of Political 
Economy, “Wake up …. The world has changed”95. We need the country knowledge and the 
disciplinary knowledge to truly understand the dynamics at work.  
 
Good political economy should, almost in conception, be comparative political economy. In 
developing an IPE framework for the study of contemporary China, we can also contribute to 
the evolution of a discipline that looks away from the core heartlands of both the global 
political economy and the heartlands of IPE academia. As such, the future of both area studies 
and IPE can perhaps best be enriched by each acknowledging the merits of each other, and 
facilitating a more comprehensive literature on the political economy of developing states. 
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